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I. INTRODUCTION

The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right
of assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions. 1 But courts have
been mired in narrow textual interpretations of the Amendment for at
least the last eighty years, and have only parsimoniously recognized
some aspects of the right, taking the smallest of steps forward on each
occasion, and not infrequently reversing direction while generously
sowing the seeds of confusion. 2
How is it that this Amendment, surely a glorious ornament of the
age of political enlightenment, has suffered so much textual and
linguistic abuse at the hands of the judiciary? 3 As Professor Sanjay
Chhablani observes, “the Court has adopted a number of constructions
of the Sixth Amendment that plainly contravene its text and are
increasingly less protective of individual liberty.” 4
The reader can be forgiven for concluding that certain elements of
the judiciary will do anything to limit citizens’ rights under the
Constitution. Far from being the guardians of the Constitution, those
elements of the judiciary seem, in fact, to be its gatekeepers. The twin
paths of linguistic and jurisprudential mismanagement can be traced
from approximately the time of the Great Depression until the present. 5
∗ Dr. John Olsson is a lecturer in law and criminology at University of Bangor School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. But see Stephanos Bibas, Justice Kennedy’s Sixth Amendment Pragmatism, 44
MCGEORGE L. REV. 211 (2013).
3. Nobody has expressed this idea better or more passionately than Justice Story in his
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1833).
4. Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 48889 (2009).
5. A succession of ground breaking cases from that era demonstrate how this issue began to
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As Alfredo Garcia has noted, “[t]he Supreme Court’s recent
interpretation of the amendment has been marked by doctrinal
inconsistency and by a failure to adhere to the functional and symbolic
values that are inherent in the amendment.” 6 More critically, Garcia
believes that the “Court has adopted a crime control ‘ideology’, stressing
efficiency rather than the core ideal of a fair trial that the amendment is
designed to safeguard.” 7
As is well known, the Amendment, as it has stood for the last 220
years, states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
8
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

II. MORE THAN THE MERE PRESENCE OF AN ATTORNEY
Anyone reading this text will marvel at the simplicity and
directness of the language. 9 Much eighteenth century legal English is
nowadays almost impenetrable as to its intention, but in this case, the
meaning is as clear to us today as it must have been to newspaper
readers when the Bill of Rights first appeared in the public press in
1789. 10
And yet, even the most basic elements of the provision have been
contended. As Professor Justin Marceau has pointed out, it has not
always been accepted that assistance of counsel is required to be
effective for the promise of the Amendment to be fulfilled. 11 In fact, it
was almost 200 years after ratification in Congress before the U.S.

be prominent from that time on, including the 1932 case of Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932),
and the slightly later case of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
6. ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: A
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE, ix (1992).
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9. See id.
10. “Between 1789 and 1791, the question of whether we would even have a Bill of Rights
was one of the most hotly debated issues of the day. Legislatures discussed it; newspapers wrote
about it; and people were passionate in their opinions.” Hon. Damon J. Keith, Challenges for the
Constitution in the 1990’s “How May the Constitution Continue to Meet the Emerging Needs of A
Changing Nation,” 34 HOW. L.J. 483, 484 (1991).
11. Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1161, 1164-65 (2012).
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Supreme Court finally took the plunge and recognized that assistance
means effective assistance. 12 But it is scarcely credible that it could have
taken so long for such a simple idea to take hold. How could anyone
define assistance as a quality that could lack effectiveness and still be
meaningful? Put even more simply, if assistance is not effective, can it
still be called ‘assistance’? 13 Finally, however, the Court rose to the
occasion in Strickland v. Washington, stating “[t]hat a person who
happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused . . . is not
enough to satisfy the constitutional command.” 14
The reading, which was tacitly accepted prior to Strickland, does
follow a perverse type of textualist rationale: the framers did not say that
assistance had to be effective and therefore, apparently, it could not be
inferred. 15 This is not to say that Strickland was a satisfactory result. As
Chhablani notes, the Strickland Court redefined a fair trial as one in
which the result is reliable, rather than one in which the procedures are
fair. 16 Moreover, the Strickland burden of proof on the defendant to
establish that an attorney’s ineffectiveness prejudiced the outcome is a
heavy one. 17
But textualism taken to its extremes is always perverse and,
moreover, when textualism actually involves a gross misreading of the
text it is nothing less than repugnant. 18 William Treanor, for example,
argues that some scholars have tried to emphasize the Bill of Rights as
rights “of the people”, rather than as the rights of individuals, and points
out how, given the wording of the Sixth Amendment, this textualist
interpretation is plainly incorrect.19 As will be shown below, evidence
of poor textual interpretation is found in other examples of judicial
12. Id. at 1165-66. “In 1970, the Supreme Court in McMann v. Richardson established that
[the] right to counsel requires effective and competent legal representation for defendants.” Sean
Michael Fitzgerald, Losing Sight of the Forest for the Trees: The Supreme Court’s Misapplication
of Sixth Amendment Strickland Analysis in Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, 21 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 681, 684 (2013) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
(1970)).
13. Marceau, supra note 11, at 1165-66.
14. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
15. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 389 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
Sixth Amendment as originally understood and ratified meant only that a defendant had a right to
employ counsel, or to use volunteered services . . . “).
16. Chhablani, supra note 4, at 542-43.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation
to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 752 (1995)
(arguing that “[i]n its new form, textualism resembles the extreme versions of intentionalism that
the textualists have long criticized.”).
19. William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original
Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487 (2007).
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tinkering with the meaning of the Amendment.
III. A SPEEDY AND PUBLIC TRIAL
There has long been contention as to whether the right to assistance
of counsel applied to plea bargain hearings. 20 It is only with the recent
decisions in Missouri v. Frye 21 and Lafler v. Cooper, 22 which were
decided by the Supreme Court on the same day, that this issue was at last
resolved. For decades, most criminal convictions have of course
resulted from plea bargains, which have traditionally been viewed as
pre-trial events. Both Frye and Lafler have now given the official
imprimatur to the daily reality of courts throughout the land: “plea
bargaining . . . is the criminal justice system.” 23 It is, therefore, only
now official that at the plea bargain hearing the defendant is entitled to
the assistance of counsel. 24
Again, the fact that this defect subsisted for so many decades is
directly attributable to a textualist misreading of the Amendment, which
has allowed the focus to be placed on the trial itself. It appears that in
construing the Amendment, judges have placed emphasis on the trial and
the stages of the trial, quite simply because the thematic phrase of the
Amendment ‘In all criminal prosecutions’ has been backgrounded by a
school of thought which equated the trial with the prosecution, a view
tacitly taken, if not expressed, in Strickland. 25 Whether textualism can
be reconciled with, “reliability,” however, is another matter. 26
The standard judicial interpretation of the Amendment therefore
appears to have been as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial
~ by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
~ and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
~ to be confronted with the witnesses against him;

20. The earlier decision of Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), applied only to guilty pleas
and thus left the door open to ambiguity on this issue.
21. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
22. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
23. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
24. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1399; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1376.
25. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
26. See Chhablani, supra note 4, at 543.
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~ to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
~ and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

27

The above formatting places the emphasis on trial.
This is
understandable to a degree, given the historical perspective of the
Amendment and in view of the evils it set out to address at the time,
specifically that a person could be deprived of life or property without a
trial. 28 However, I believe a proper parsing of the Amendment should
read:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
(i) to a (a) speedy and (b) public trial, by an (c) impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
(ii) to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
(iii) to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
(iv) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and
(v) to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

29

We, therefore, effectively, have these several rights subsumed into one,
which are collectively “the right.” In other words, the right is an
integrated one – the sum is greater than the parts; they are not separable
from each other. As Randolph Jonakait has noted, the Sixth Amendment
“requires reading each of its specific clauses not in isolation, but as part
of one integrated Sixth Amendment.” 30
The right summarizes how the framers saw the process of providing
the suspect with a fair opportunity to conduct his defense, in other words
due process. The right, as framed, particularizes the essential elements
of the defense. All aspects of the right pertain to the prosecution and not

27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28. See United States v. Polouizzi, 687 F. Supp. 2d 133, 169-170 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated,
393 Fed. Appx. 784 (2d Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (explaining that the Sixth Amendment’s right to
trial by jury “was envisaged as a check against overreaching by the new federal government”);
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 (1970) (“[T]he primary purpose of the jury is to prevent the
possibility of oppression by the Government; the jury interposes between the accused and his
accuser the judgment of laymen who are less tutored perhaps than a judge or panel of judges, but
who at the same time are less likely to function or appear as but another arm of the Government that
has proceeded against him.”).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
30. Randolph Jonakait, Foreword: Notes for a Consistent and Meaningful Sixth Amendment,
82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 713, 713 (1992).
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just the trial: in the prosecution and throughout the prosecution, hence–
“in all criminal prosecutions”; moreover they apply to all criminal
prosecutions, hence “in all criminal prosecutions.”
IV. IN ALL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
On the above basis, one would be forgiven for thinking that the
right to counsel would long have applied to all prosecutions, and that
this was a settled, established principle. But this is not the case. Powell
v. Alabama, for example, only applied to capital prosecutions. 31 The
restriction as to capital trials appeared to be removed in Johnson v.
Zerbst, 32 but with reference to federal prosecutions only, and in Betts v.
Brady, 33 a habeas appeal from the state of Maryland, the Court held that
there was no right of counsel for indigent defendants prosecuted by the
state. 34 The Court cited the fact that many states had laid down their
own policies regarding indigent defendants’ right to counsel, and
therefore “in the great majority of the States, it has been the considered
judgment of the people, their representatives, and their courts that an
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases is not a
fundamental right.” 35 However, in this instance the court seemed to
ignore the fact that the Constitution of the state of Maryland does
guarantee counsel as of right. 36 In Betts, only Justice Hugo Black
considered that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed an obligation on the
states to fulfil the command of the Sixth Amendment 37 to guarantee “any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”38
However, the Court had consistently held, from the time of Barron v.
Baltimore, 39 that the first eight amendments of the Constitution applied
only to the Federal government and not to the individual states.40 It was
only much later in Gideon v. Wainwright 41 that the Court recognized that
the Fourteenth Amendment did indeed extend the protections of the

31. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-72 (1932).
32. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
33. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
34. Id. at 473.
35. Id. at 471.
36. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. ART. 21.
37. Betts, 316 U.S. at 474.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
39. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
40. See, e.g., id. at 250 (stating that the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the
Constitution apply only to the federal government).
41. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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Sixth Amendment to all defendants in state prosecutions. 42
In other words, it took from 1791 to 1963 for defendants in all
criminal prosecutions, federal and state, to be granted the right of
assistance to counsel, 43 a further 23 years for the Court to insist that that
assistance had to be effective 44 and another 26 years for recognition that
assistance was required at stages outside the trial itself. 45
Does this now mean that every defendant is protected, throughout a
criminal prosecution? Alas, it does not, because, despite all of the
tribulations that Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has gone through,
further opportunities for distorting the intentions of the framers have
never been capable of escaping determined judicial machinations. 46
V. ENTER THE CRITICAL STAGE DOCTRINE
Under the critical stage doctrine, any prosecution is considered to
consist of a number of key stages in addition to the trial itself.47 Despite
the doctrine’s identification with Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, it
finds its roots equally in Fourteenth Amendment case law, specifically
Hamilton v. Alabama, 48 where the Court ruled that the absence of
counsel at the defendant’s arraignment was a violation of due process
rights prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 49 In Hamilton, the
Court referred to Powell v. Alabama, 50 where it had stated that in capital
cases the guiding hand of counsel was required “at every step in the
proceedings.” 51
Critical stages include the indictment, some identification
processes, and certain preliminary hearings. 52 In United States v.
42. Id. at 343.
43. Id.
44. Jackson v. Michigan, 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
45. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
46. In order to appreciate the truth of this point, we have only to look back at the length of
time it took to have all defendants in all criminal prosecutions given the right of assistance to
counsel, the delay in insisting that that assistance must be effective, and recognition that assistance
needed to be available at stages of the prosecution which happened to lie outside of courtroom
processes.
47. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967) (“It is central to that principle that
in addition to counsel’s presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone
against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s
absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.”).
48. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
49. Id. at 54.
50. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
51. Id. at 68-69.
52. Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1651-52 (2003). Note, however, that trial consolidation hearings are
excluded. See Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 313 (6th Cir. 2007).
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Wade, 53 the defendant had been identified post-indictment by the victims
in an identification line-up without the presence of his attorney. The
Court held that an identification line-up was a critical stage of the
prosecution and therefore the attorney ought to have been present. 54
However, in Kirby v. Illinois, 55 the Court ruled that if the line-up occurs
before indictment, the absence of counsel is not a violation of the
Amendment. In a sense, therefore, Kirby 56 overrules Wade 57 because
police forces can simply choose to postpone the indictment. 58 They are
able to say, following the Court’s ruling in Kirby, that the Amendment
has not been violated because the prosecution has not yet commenced.
The logic of this is severely flawed and lends itself to absurdity: how can
a stage considered to be critical post-indictment not be critical just
because it occurs pre-indictment? 59 If we are to keep the critical stage
doctrine then it should be the case that the right attaches just because a
critical stage has been reached, because such a critical stage is itself
evidence that the prosecution is in progress. To do otherwise is to
reinforce an irrational formalism.
Moreover, the Amendment was designed to ensure that the suspect
is not prejudiced by any aspect of the prosecution. 60 A prosecution is a
legal pursuit of an individual for an alleged crime. If a prosecution is a
legal pursuit of an individual for an alleged crime, once that individual is
targeted the organized forces of society are ranged against him-he is,
effectively, being prosecuted and must therefore be entitled to the
protection of the law. Such was the view of the minority in the Kirby
court. 61 They followed the line of reasoning given in Wade. 62 The risks
posed by a pre-indictment line-up are no less than those posed by a post53. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
54. Id. at 237.
55. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
56. Id.
57. Wade, 388 U.S. 218.
58. See Forte v. State, 759 S.W.2d 128, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), overruled by
McCambridge v. State, 778 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (explaining that “the basis and
rationale of the Wade-Gilbert rule and the Kirby line of cases [is] difficult if not impossible to
reconcile”).
59. See Metzger, supra note 52, at 1668 (“Pre-charge bargaining is an important aspect of
effective advocacy. When the government has committed itself to prosecuting an individual and its
failure to file formal charges is a mere formality, a defendant should have the right to the assistance
of counsel.”).
60. See, e.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965) (stating that the right of trial by
jury “was clearly intended to protect the accused from oppression by the Government”); see also
Metzger, supra note 52, at 1639 (stating that the American colonies “emphasized the right to
counsel as a guarantee against prosecutorial privilege and governmental overreaching.”).
61. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 698-699.
62. Wade, 388 U.S. 218.
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indictment line-up. 63 The minority further reasoned that to rely on the
abstract notion that a prosecution commences only upon formal
indictment is to deny the suspect the protection of the Amendment. 64
The same issues arose in the case of United States v. Ash 65 where
the identification process had been a photographic line-up. Because
there was no actual confrontation between prosecutor and defendant, it
could not be viewed as a critical stage. 66 For that reason, the absence of
counsel was not a breach of the Amendment, even though there was the
possibility of prejudice. 67 However, this narrow interpretation ignores
the basic fact that the photographic line-up was, in essence, a
confrontation between prosecutorial and defense interests, even if the
defendant was not physically present at the event.68
Judicial thinking, therefore, is that only certain events within the
overall prosecution are critical stages of the prosecution. 69 Only critical
stages are protected by the Amendment: if something occurs, even
though it may be prejudicial to the defendant, then, unless it does so at a
critical stage, the defendant is not entitled to the protection of the
Amendment. 70 But this is pure inductive reasoning. Rather than
deducing what constitutes a critical stage from the facts, courts have a
priori limited the ambit of the critical stage to certain structural events
and then dismissed as legally insignificant any event that is not a critical
stage. 71 To the contrary, the very fact that an event has the potential to
be prejudicial should be sufficient to ensure that it is, per se, a critical
stage.
As is well known, the Amendment does not refer to critical stages
of the prosecution. Its language could not be clearer: it states “in all

63. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 699.
64. Id. at 698-99.
65. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
66. Id. at 317.
67. Id. at 319.
68. See Stovall v Denno, 388 U. S. 293 (1967), for another aspect of the potential for tainted
identification evidence. In that particular case, a victim made an identification from a hospital bed
of her alleged assailant, without the suspect having the benefit of counsel.
69. For example, a defendant who is entering a guilty plea, whether the charge is a
misdemeanor or felony, is a critical stage that enjoys the right to counsel. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S.
77, 81 (2004).
70. See, e.g., Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (“The Sixth Amendment does not grant an accused the right
to have counsel present when the Government conducts a post-indictment photographic display,
containing a picture of the accused, for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an
identification of the offender.”).
71. See Metzger, supra note 52, at 1636 (arguing that the “rigid right-to-counsel doctrine
deprives modern criminal defendants of counsel at proceedings that are truly critical stages of
contemporary criminal procedure”).
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criminal prosecutions,” 72 which in this context should mean throughout
the entire prosecution process. The device of the critical stage, while
welcome in that it guarantees rights for a number of key events within
the prosecution process, is a double-edged sword because it is able to
exclude the operation of those rights for stages that are not considered
critical. 73
IV. ATTACHMENT AND INVOCATION
The Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel is generally
considered to ‘attach’ when the criminal prosecution begins, usually
when the suspect (i) learns of the charges against him and (ii) his liberty
is affected. 74 However, the attachment of the right to counsel does not
mean that the suspect is entitled to the assistance of counsel. 75 For that
right to be actuated, proceedings must have reached a critical stage. 76
One would have thought that the fact that the prosecution had
commenced was itself evidence of a critical stage, from which point the
suspect “shall” or “must” enjoy the right and that attachment of the right
would mean entitlement to exercise it.
In eighteenth-century
English-and still found in some legal contexts today–to “enjoy” means to
have the benefit or use of something, or to possess it. Thus, by stating
that the accused “shall enjoy the right,” 77 it is clear that the Amendment
commands that the accused has the benefit of the right: that it is
indisputably his right unless he chooses not to exercise it and that it
applies throughout the prosecution, viz. “in all prosecutions.”
However, in practice, the attachment of the right to counsel and the
right to assistance of counsel are separate events: the right to assistance
is actuated by a critical stage. 78 Under Jackson v. Michigan, 79 once the
right had attached police could not question a defendant in the absence
of counsel even if the defendant waived his right to have an attorney
present during questioning. This is because any direct confrontation
between the prosecutorial authorities and/or the police and the defendant

72. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
73. See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in
a pre-indictment line-up).
74. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-188 (1984).
75. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
76. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (“The presumption that counsel’s
assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at
a critical stage of his trial.”).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
78. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
79. Jackson v. Michigan, 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
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is a critical stage requiring the assistance of counsel. 80 The sole
exception to this restriction was if the defendant initiated the dialogue
and sought to confess. 81
In Montejo v. Louisiana, 82 the Court rejected Jackson on the
grounds that it was unworkable. As Michael C. Mims points out, the
Court reasoned that since some states require the assertion of his rights
by the defendant in order for the right to attach, while other states
consider attachment to commence by the court’s automatic appointment
of an attorney, then in different states Jackson would be applied
differently. 83 Offered the opportunity of removing the distinction in
Jackson between those defendants who asserted their Sixth Amendment
right and those who obtained it from the trial court, the Supreme Court
rejected this as being inconsistent with the ratio in Jackson. 84 The Court
considered that Jackson showed there to be a distinction between a
defendant who had asserted his right and one who had not. The former
would be less likely to waive his right to allow a post-indictment
interrogation, whereas the latter had not even asserted his right. 85
Thus, under Jackson, 86 as interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Montejo, 87 if the defendant had not asserted his right to
assistance of counsel then law enforcement were entitled to question him
without the assistance of counsel if he waived his Miranda 88 right to the
presence of an attorney. 89 If, however, he had previously asserted his
right to assistance of counsel then any confession he made would not be
admissible. 90
The Montejo court not only considered that the potentially different
applications of Jackson pointed to its unworkability. They also
determined that its main benefit, namely to prevent prosecution from
coercing defendants into waiving their Sixth Amendment right, was
outweighed by its potential cost, namely the danger that the guilty would
80. “[G]overnment efforts to elicit information from the accused, including interrogation,
represent “critical stages” at which the Sixth Amendment applies.” Id. at 629-630 (citing Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985)).
81. This is the bright line rule established in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
82. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009).
83. Michael C. Mims, A Trap for the Unwary: The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel After
Montejo v. Louisiana, 71 LA. L. REV. 345, 361 (2010).
84. Id. at 361-62.
85. Id. at 363.
86. Jackson v. Michigan, 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
87. State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238 (La. 2008), vacated sub nom., Montejo v. Louisiana
556 U.S. 778 (2009).
88. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
89. Montejo, 974 So. 2d at 1238.
90. Id. at 1251-52.
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walk free. 91 The Court considered that the combined prophylaxis
already being provided by exclusionary rules developed under the
Miranda, 92 Edwards, 93 and Minnick 94 line was sufficient to protect the
defendant against coercive police tactics.95 However, the Sixth
Amendment goes far wider than mere protection against police coercion:
it is intended to provide the full weight of the justice system to ensure
fairness throughout the criminal prosecution. 96
Notwithstanding this self-evident truth, instead of broadening the
rule under Jackson to include defendants who had not asserted their right
but had been granted it by the trial judge, the Court reversed Jackson,
thus extinguishing the rule altogether, 97 It no longer matters if the
defendant has asserted his right or obtained it from the court, he may be
questioned in the absence of his attorney post-indictment, providing he
waives the right to have an attorney present 98 under Miranda. 99 But, as
Michael C. Mims argues, 100 the prophylactic comforts of the Miranda
protections are wholly inadequate to address the Sixth Amendment right.
Miranda was developed in order to avoid police coercion. 101 The Sixth
Amendment exists to ensure the integrity of the adversarial system. 102
However, Patterson v Illinois 103 had already decided that a waiver of
Miranda rights did not violate the Sixth Amendment. In other words, a
valid waiver under the Fifth Amendment will suffice to act as a waiver
under the Sixth Amendment. 104 The Court was able to attack Jackson in

91. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 793-794 (2009).
92. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
93. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S 477 (1981).
94. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
95. Montejo, 556 U.S. at 794-95.
96. See, e.g., Meredith B. Halama, Loss of a Fundamental Right: The Sixth Amendment as a
Mere “Prophylactic Rule,” 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207, 1241 (1999) (“The Sixth Amendment exists
to protect the fairness and balance of our adversarial system.”); Alfredo Garcia, Clash of the Titans:
The Difficult Reconciliation of a Fair Trial and a Free Press in Modern American Society, 32
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1107, 1108 (1992) (arguing that “the rights conferred on the accused by the
Sixth Amendment are designed to ensure fairness in the criminal process”).
97. Montejo, 556 U.S. at 797.
98. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stated: “Today’s decision eliminates the rule
that ‘any waiver of Sixth Amendment rights given in a discussion initiated by police is presumed
invalid’ once a defendant has invoked his right to counsel. Id. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
100. Mims, supra note 83, at 369.
101. Id. at 352-53.
102. Id. at 355.
103. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
104. Id. at 298-99. It should be noted that in Patterson the defendant at no time requested
counsel. He had been indicted, but had not asserted his right to counsel. It also bears observing that
the minority in Patterson did not accept that a waiver under Miranda sufficed to satisfy the Sixth
Amendment requirement, given that the waiver of a right to have an attorney present during

2014]

WHO AMENDED THE AMENDMENT?

27

this way because, at an earlier stage in Montejo’s appeal, the Louisiana
Supreme Court had held that, under Jackson, a defendant must request
counsel or otherwise assert his right to counsel, in order to invoke his
Sixth Amendment rights. 105 According to the Louisiana Supreme Court,
since Montejo had not made such a request or asserted a right to counsel
in any other way, he had not activated the protection of the
Amendment. 106 This is surely a very small, pettifogging point: how was
Montejo to know, when told that counsel would be appointed for him,
that his Sixth Amendment rights were not being engaged? Moreover,
following Johnson v. Zerbst, the defendant did not make “an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right”. 107 Standing ‘mute’
can hardly be described as a voluntary, knowing or intelligent waiver.108
Further, as the dissenting voices in Montejo argued, it is not significant
how the attorney-client relationship comes about, the point is that in
Montejo’s case it must have attached—even though by court
appointment. 109
If the words “shall enjoy the right” mean anything, then surely an
insistence on the assertion of the right is a distortion of the
Amendment’s intent. 110 In this context—and this is not a matter of
subjective interpretation—”shall” means “must.” 111 It is obligatory that
the suspect has the right, subject only to a voluntary, intelligent and
knowing waiver.
Further, as Michael Mims points out, 112 there is now a fatal
muddying of the waters between the right under the Fifth Amendment,

questioning is hardly the same thing as the waiver of a right to have assistance of counsel.
105. State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1260-1261 (La. 2008), vacated sub nom., Montejo v.
Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009). See also Montoya v. Collins, 955 F. 2d 279 (1992).
106. Id. at 1260-61.
107. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938).
108. See generally State v. Carter, 664 So. 2d 367, 383 (La. 1995) (stating that “something
more than mere mute acquiescence in the appointment of counsel is necessary to show the
defendant has asserted his right to counsel sufficiently to trigger the enhanced protection provided
by Michigan v. Jackson’s prophylactic rule.”).
109. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 804 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. See id. at 809 (“[T]he Court fails to identify the real reliance interest at issue in this case:
the public’s interest in knowing that counsel, once secured, may be reasonably relied upon as a
medium between the accused and the power of the State. That interest lies at the heart of the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee, and is surely worthy of greater consideration than it is given by today’s
decision.”).
111. Except when used by the first person singular, e.g. ‘I shall’, the word ‘shall’ always
means ‘must.’ Nowadays, law framers tend to avoid ‘shall’, but it is still found in American laws–
the Patriot Act, for example: “The Director of the United States Secret Service shall take
appropriate actions . . .” and many other examples–also means ‘is obliged to,’ ‘has a duty to.’
112. Mims, supra note 83, at 370.

28

AKRON JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & POLICY

[5:15

as held in Edwards v. Arizona, 113 and the right under the Sixth
Amendment. This is contrary to the intent of the Sixth Amendment:
once the prosecution commences the defendant ought to have the
protection of the Sixth Amendment. Falling back on Miranda, as though
it were a default of some kind, is nothing less than a sham.
VII. CONCLUSION: HIGH LEGAL ART AND JUDICIAL DISINGENUOUSNESS
Despite its conceptual shortcomings, as outlined above, the critical
stage doctrine at least provides some protections, but overruling
Jackson 114 has diminished the significance of the critical stage, and
further weakened the scope and effectiveness of the Sixth Amendment.
Equally alarming in this context was the decision in Kansas v Ventris 115
where it was held that the defendant can no longer exclude as of right
pre-trial “uncounseled admissions elicited by government agents.” 116
The court’s explanation for this ruling, which involves a particularly
convoluted interpretation of the Massiah 117 doctrine, was that the
violation occurred pre-trial and thus its impact on the outcome of the
trial was irrelevant. 118 Professor James Tomkovicz considers the
decision in Ventris to be “dubious and disingenuous” and “hopelessly
misguided.” 119 The decision in Ventris is undoubtedly a serious
interpretative flaw in that, once again, it equates the trial with the
prosecution. 120
The Sixth Amendment 121 is a pillar of the U.S. Constitution, itself
the highest legal art of the eighteenth, or indeed any other, century, in
any country. Yet its first two centuries of existence have not delivered
its promise in anything like the way in which the framers must have
envisaged. It has been haggled over and mangled linguistically and
jurisprudentially possibly more than any other constitutional
provision. 122 The reader must hope that these onslaughts have not
113. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S 477 (1981).
114. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
115. Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586 (2009).
116. James J. Tomkovicz, Sacrificing Massiah: Confusion over Exclusion and Erosion of the
Right to Counsel, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1 (2012).
117. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
118. Ventris, 556 U.S. at 593-94.
119. Tomkovicz, supra note 116, at 1.
120. See Ventris, 556 U.S. at 596 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“We have never endorsed
the notion that the pretrial right to counsel stands at the periphery of the Sixth Amendment. To the
contrary, we have explained that the pretrial period is ‘perhaps the most critical period of the
proceedings’ during which a defendant ‘requires the guiding hand of counsel.’”).
121. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
122. See Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American
Sentencing Law and How it Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2010) (discussing a
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wounded it fatally and that the judicial activism which has long been its
lot to endure will one day be replaced by a new spirit of the laws,
or-rather-by that same spirit of the laws that acted as the wellspring for
the inception of the Bill of Rights at a time when an anxious legislature
saw itself as the bulwark between tyranny and civilization, and knew
that one of its main tasks was to ensure the protection of the individual
from the ravages of powerful and despotic governments. 123

related topic in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence).
123. See generally BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (D.W. Carrithers ed.,
1977).

